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13 Climate chan ge and planning for 
the military 
Michael Brzoska 
A b s t r a c t  
A core debate about the consequences of climate change concerns its security-re-
lated aspects. Elements of that debate include the expected extent of climate as well 
as definitions of security. Official documents on national security and defense 
planning are investigated with respect to these two elements of debate. A content 
analysis of relevant documents from 38 countries reveals a diverse response by na-
tional security establishments to the challenges presented by climate change, 
which also changes over time. Seven potential roles for armed forces in response to 
climate change are identified and quantified for the selected documents. A pre-
dominant expectation is a greater demand for disaster relief by armed forces. 
However, there are also governments which expect an increase in traditional se-
curity threats, as well as governments who do not foresee any security challenge 
resulting from climate change. 
KEYWORDS: Armed forces, defense planning, national security, disaster manage-
ment. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Climate change will affect the conditions under which societies, governments, and 
institutions in general are going to have to operate. Most probably, this will also in-
clude armed forces. Climate change should therefore be of concern to those respon-
sible for the roles and functions of the military. And indeed, the relevance of climate 
change for armed forces has been widely debated, also by a number of security and 
defense think tanks (CNA 2007, CNA 2014; CSG 2018), among various militaries 
(Brzoska 2012a, GMACC 2014, Brzoska 2015, Scott and Kahn 2016, Causevitz 2017) 
and, more prominently, in political fora such as the United Nations Security Council 
(Detraz and Betsill 2009, Scott and Ku 2018). 
Views expressed in these debates have ranged widely, from seeing a world 
marked by “climate wars” (Dyer 2008) – implying a great demand for traditional mil-
itary forces – to a need to cut military spending in order to be able to finance climate 
adaptation and mitigation measures (WBGU 2008). 
Academic analysis has been similarly diverse. Some authors have evaluated the 
debates on the potential military consequences of climate change as very forceful and 
effective tool of advocacy or changing the course of climate-related policies (Brauch 
2009, Floyd 2010), while others have analyzed them as results of a deliberate effort to 
push for an increased militarization of societies (Hartmann 2010, Gilbert 2012, Mar-
zek 2015). 
The purpose of this paper is to go beyond such contradicting perspectives in two 
ways. One is to provide a more differentiated analysis of the consequences climate 
change can have for armed forces. While there are some straightforward connections 
between climate change and armed forces – e. g. the military’s contribution to climate 
change due to its consumption of energy – others are subject to a number of construc-
tions about the future risks of climate change and the relationships between major 
powers and weaker states. As a result, a number of different potential “military fu-
tures” are identified. The second innovation of this paper is to empirically investigate 
to which extent these “military futures” are informing current military planning. For 
this purpose, official documents on military planning were analyzed. While percep-
tions of the implications of climate change for armed forces and military policies may 
change in the future, the empirical investigation of the current planning of future roles 
and functions of armed forces is an indicator of the future effects of climate change on 
armed forces. 
This paper first presents the state of debate on the military and climate change 
in its various strands. Future pathways for the military, which can be identified in 
relevant literature, will be illustrated by examples from the two countries, in which 
the debate on climate change and the military has been most extensive, the United 
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Kingdom and the United States. The following section empirically reviews how “mil-
itary futures” are represented in official planning documents. This includes discuss-
ing two factors potentially shaping different perspectives on the future of armed 
forces, namely perceptions of climate change as a security issue and the power status 
of countries. The conclusions sum up the paper and link the results to the broader 
debate on the connections between climate change and the military. 
T h e  m i l i t a r y  i n  t h e  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  d i s c o u r s e  
The military has contributed to the climate change debate in three strands of debate 
and literature, both as an object of and as a contributor to discourses.1 
First, and most prominently, there is the debate on security threats or risks 
marked by major climate change. Some analysts and policy makers have painted 
dark pictures of an unstable and violent future, implying a greatly increased need to 
protect people and countries by military means if mitigation of climate change failed 
(Schwarz and Randal 2003; Dyer 2008; CNA 2014, Wallace and Silander 2018). The 
large majority of authors with such a pessimistic view of the consequences of climate 
change argue for drastic changes in climate-related policies in order to prevent fu-
ture wars. Still, an increased need for armed forces is easily justifiable when sub-
stantial security consequences loom (Brzoska 2009; Hartmann 2010; Marzek 2015). 
Predictions of major disasters, large numbers of refugees, and political instability 
can be easily understood to imply important roles for armed forces in an insecure 
future. The literature on climate change-induced security threats and risks is full of 
rather general remarks on the future demand for activities by armed forces in an en-
vironment, in which global warming exceeded two degrees Celsius. 
Armed forces have not only been an object of advocates of major changes in cli-
mate policies. A second link between the military and climate change has been the 
prominent voice of active and former high-ranking officers in the climate policy dis-
course. The importance of officers and institutions associated with the US armed 
forces, particularly the Navy, for the climate policy debate in the US in the past dec-
ade is well documented (Floyd 2010). The above-mentioned study by Schwarz and 
Randall, one of the earliest scenario studies of climate change, was sponsored by the 
Office of Net Assessment in the US Department of Defense. Within the Pentagon, 
the various branches of the armed forces initiated internal and external studies 
(Brzoska 2012a; Marzek 2015; Thomas 2017). Concerns over consequences of climate 
                                                                          
1 This is a slightly revised and abbreviated version of Climate Change and Military Planning, published in the 
International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, Vol. 7 Issue: 2, 2015, pp.172–190. 
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change are often focused on particular issues such as demand for military capabili-
ties to meet humanitarian disasters (McGrady et al 2010) or effects of climate change 
on military bases (Smith et al 2010, National Academy of Sciences 2011, Foley 2012). 
In most of these contributions, climate change is seen through the lens of the effects 
of climate change on traditional military operations. In a second strand, the focus is 
on ways the military itself can contribute to climate change mitigation. In addition 
to the US military, some others, such as the UK and Australian armed forces, initi-
ated studies on the security effects of climate change and formulated a full-fledged 
climate strategy (United Kingdom 2009, Thomas 2017). The Global Military Advisory 
Council on Climate Change (GMACCC), a group of military officers from around the 
world, has produced a number of reports and policy statements (GMACCC 2014). 
A third strand of literature on the link between climate change and the military has 
been a lively, critical debate on the use of climate change in discourses on future secu-
rity, and particularly military, requirements (Oels 2011; Trombetta 2012; Rothe 2016; 
Dietz, von Lucke and Wellmann 2016). Most of this debate revolves around different 
concepts of securitization. While securitization is a broader concept for the analysis of 
constructing an issue as a security threat, the military dimension can be easily made a 
part of it. Taking the predictions about growing instability and disasters as a clue, a 
number of authors have critically assessed whether the talk about insecurity in the two 
strands of discussion have led to a discourse dominated by the idea that climate change 
needs to be met with larger armed forces. Authors predominantly agree (but see Gil-
bert 2012) that, at least so far, this has not occurred. There have been no major conse-
quences of climate change for armed forces yet. “Exceptional measures” such as large 
increases in military budgets or major expansions of the roles of armed forces, which 
would be indicators of successful securitization in the analysis of the “Copenhagen 
School” of securitization have not occurred (Brzoska 2009; Oels 2012). Authors are 
more divided on changes in security “practices”, for instance the role of armed forces 
in border or disaster management. These would be indicators of securitization for au-
thors of the “Paris School” such as Bigo and Balzacq (Balzacq 2010). Nevertheless, there 
is mostly talk of such change and little empirical evidence of it (Brzoska 2012; Oels 
2012). In this strand of critical analysis, climate change is increasingly found to be one 
element among several such as terrorism and cyber security, which present largely un-
predictable future risks (Oels 2011). The type and nature of these risks, including cli-
mate change, require broad sets of measures, such as the prevention and strengthen-
ing of the resilience of potentially affected people and communities. Attention in the 
debate on the possible securitization of climate change has therefore moved away from 
concerns about armed forces to broader issues about the consequences of “riskifica-
tion”, such as a shift of decision-making away from democratically elected bodies to 
groups of “risk experts” (Corry 2012, Oels 2012, Trombetta 2012). 
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In summary, the attention given to potential security consequences of climate 
change, including possible future “climate wars”, has also raised the profile of armed 
forces in climate discourses, albeit in a variety of different ways. Military officers 
have raised their voices warning of the security consequences of climate change, but 
also discussing future military engagements. Militaries have been portrayed as be-
ing directly threatened by climate change, for instance because of sea level rise, but 
also as possible “winners” in terms of additional resources and missions. However, 
much uncertainty about the consequences of climate change for the future role of 
armed forces remains dominant, precluding a dominant discourse on prescriptions 
on what to expect and what to do. The following two sections aim at advancing the 
discussion by first providing a classification of potential future roles and functions 
of armed forces in more detail and then assessing the prevalence of these military 
futures in a set of relevant documents. 
C o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  fo r  a r m e d  fo r c e s  
P o t e n t i a l  p a t h w a y s  
The following classification of possible future roles and functions of armed forces, 
called “military futures”, is based on a collection of suggestions found in relevant doc-
uments and the literature summarized above. Most of the examples are drawn from 
the United States and the United Kingdom, the two countries, in which the links be-
tween climate change and the military have been most vigorously debated (Brzoska 
2012a). While not exhaustive, the six potential “military futures” identified below as 
possible consequences of climate change for armed forces capture a large part of the 
various strands of the debate outlined above. By themselves, these “military futures” 
represent ideal types, which are often combined in particular documents and discus-
sions. While being useful to illustrate different perspectives on the future armed 
forces, the six’ military futures should not be considered to be exclusive. They are likely 
to influence the future of armed forces in some combination, if at all. 
Each of the “military futures” is marked by a particular perspective of the way, 
in which climate change is expected to affect armed forces. These perspectives will 
be further explained below. They have consequences for the major characteristics of 
armed forces, reflecting inputs, internal workings, and output of these institutions. 
Three dimensions reflecting these characteristics seem to be of particular relevance 
in relation to climate change (see Table 1). One is the potential changes in what armed 
forces are actually used for. Force functions may or may not change with climate
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 force functions force structures financial resource allocations  
“greener” military little change; some 
reluctance to perform 
energy intensive 
operations (Air Force) 
little change, some 
reductions in energy 
intensive elements 
(Air Force, Navy)  
additional costs through 
investments into alternative 
energy; energy savings 
“leaner” military focus on high-priority 
functions 
focus on elite forces shifts away from military 
spending to finance climate 




none none additional costs to preserve 
base structures and operational 
capabilities 
armed “rescuers” greater emphasis on 
disaster management 
capacities 













assets, ground forces 
for peace-keeping 
additional costs for low-
violence interventions 
climate warriors greater emphasis on 
war fighting 
more military assets 
for war-fighting 
additional costs for military 
investments across the board 
Table 1:  Potential  climate change induced changes (compared to baseline without 
climate change).  
change, depending on differing perspectives of the implications of climate change 
for armed forces. Another indicator is the funding of armed forces. As climate 
change mitigation and adaptation are costly, there are financial trade-offs. 
On the other hand, additional functions of armed forces associated with climate 
change require additional funding. A third indicator is changes in the composition 
of armed forces, the relative importance of elements of armed forces performing 
particular functions. Certain operational elements may become more, or less, im-
portant with climate change. 
“ G r e e n e r ”  m i l i t a r y  
One aspect of the debate on climate change and the military has been that it has di-
rected a spotlight on armed forces as a major producer of greenhouse gases (see e. g. 
Klare 2003). While there are no reliable estimates of the global greenhouse gas pro-
duction by militaries, it is likely that their shares in global greenhouse gas production 
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are similar or higher than the shares of military expenditures in global income be-
cause of energy intensive activities such as transport and flying. 
By far the largest consumer of energy and producer of greenhouse gases in the 
world is the US military. Its size, global spread, and military action in places distant 
from most major installations, such as Afghanistan during the military intervention 
there, make the Pentagon’s agency in charge of supplying energy to the largest single 
customer of energy in the world. 
US armed forces have seriously begun to take energy considerations into ac-
count for the full spectrum of their activities (Brzoska 2012a, Thomas 2017; CSA 
2018). They have defined energy saving goals and objectives in operations, including 
combat operations, as well as acquisitions. One of the objectives is the increased use 
of alternative energy. Substantial amounts of money have been invested in solar and 
wind energy on military bases as well as the adaptation of systems, such as aircrafts 
and warships, to use biofuels. Reporting and inspection schemes have been devel-
oped and more and more data on energy use by the US armed forces is becoming 
available (United States 2011; 2016). It is difficult to assess the effects of all these ac-
tivities compared to changes in US military engagements, particularly the partial 
withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan. However, overall energy consumption and pro-
duction of greenhouse gases have been reduced substantially, from 110 billion barrels 
in 2011 to 90 billion barrels in 2016 (United States 2017). The UK Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) and military have also adopted substantive measures to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. As in the case of the US, it is difficult to separate efforts to “green” the 
military to changes in military deployments. Still, the consumption of fuel and pro-
duction of greenhouse gases have been reduced substantially since 2009 (United 
Kingdom 2018). Little is known about efforts in other countries. The potential to save 
energy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions is clearly substantial within the current 
spectrum of military activities, particularly, with respect to flying and other activi-
ties requiring substantial amounts of fuel. “Greening” the military is not necessarily 
about changing its functions (Table 1), but is obviously linked to military deploy-
ments and operations. Saving energy also saves costs; developing alternative energy, 
however, requires additional investments. 
“ L e a n e r ”  m i l i t a r y  
Mitigation and adaptation to climate change require investments. In view of the un-
certainty of future security risks of climate change and the role of the armed forces in 
meeting them, defense ministries might be expected to find it harder to justify the al-
location of resources to the military. Furthermore, one can argue that the prevention 
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of potential conflicts through spending to limit climate change before conflicts arise is 
a smarter strategy than investing in the military to later meet these risks (WBGU 2008). 
Although this sounds logical, there is little evidence that this argument has been 
used, successfully or not, in political decision-making on military budgets. However, 
there is more evidence of an indirect link in many countries, via the distribution of 
financial austerity measures over government departments. In NATO countries, for 
instance, military spending has declined during the past few years (SIPRI 2018). 
Beyond mitigation, a feature that might facilitate funding shifts away from the 
military is the increase in general debates on security of comprehensive concepts such 
as risks and threats. Rather than giving the military a privileged role in providing for 
security, as was the case with traditional security thinking, it becomes one actor 
among an assemblage of actors and practices funded to prevent and manage future 
risks. Climate change, marked by a high degree of uncertainty about its consequences, 
is one of the risks, for which a good number of actors, such as disaster management 
organizations, can legitimately claim resources for management purposes. 
Global military spending amounted to about 1.7 trillion US dollar in 2017 (SIPRI 
2018). Obviously, this offers major opportunities for the redirection of financial re-
sources. Governments wishing to find money for investments into mitigation or ad-
aptation measures therefore might find it attractive to reduce their expenditures on 
armed forces. The armed forces resulting from such cuts will only be able to perform 
some of their earlier functions. They are also likely to be “trimmer”, with a focus on 
elite forces (Table 1). 
C l i m a t e  “ v i c t im s ”  
One of the effects of climate change on the military mentioned in the secondary lit-
erature and some official documents is the threat to low-lying military installations, 
particularly naval bases. Both in the US and the UK, assessments of the dangers of 
sea-level rise for bases have been initiated, which conclude that costs of adapting 
military installations to higher sea levels will be substantial (National Academy of 
Sciences 2011; US GAO 2014; United States 2014; Union of Concerned Scientists 2016, 
United Kingdom 2009). 
Beyond costs, climate change may have geostrategic implications. It has been 
argued, for instance, that costs for oversee deployments may rise with the greater 
likelihood of extreme weather (Foresight 2011, 46). If governments choose to main-
tain deployments, they will have to allocate additional funding to their armed forces. 
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A r m ed  “ r e s cu e r s ”  
As most predictions of climate change indicate an increase in extreme weather, it is 
very likely that the number and intensity of disasters will grow. This, in turn, will 
increase the demand for disaster management. 
Disaster management is done by a host of local, national, and global organiza-
tions, public, volunteer, and private. Armed forces are already often involved in dis-
aster prevention, management, and relief, both within their home countries and 
abroad (Schnabel and Krupnaski 2012, Scott and Kahn 2016). 
Equipping armed forces with additional capabilities to perform functions re-
lated to disaster management will lead to changes in force structures. Additional as-
sets will be required; elements of armed forces able to perform rescue tasks have to 
be expanded (Oxfam and CNA 2011). A major justification is the associated costs. 
Armed forces are generally judged to be a cost-effective solution to disaster manage-
ment because personnel and equipment are predominantly employed for other pur-
poses and only directed to disaster management in times of need. 
The role of armed forces in disaster management is partly limited in many coun-
tries because disaster management is seen as a civilian activity, within civilian legal 
and organizational frameworks. Using armed forces in disaster management can be 
seen as a form of “militarization”, even if it occurs for beneficial purposes. One rea-
son the government in Rangoon was reluctant to allow foreign organizations into 
Myanmar after the devastating cyclone Nargis in 2008 was its fear that foreign hu-
manitarian support with military assets might lead to a military intervention, as in-
deed suggested by the French government at the time (Brzoska 2017). 
A r m ed  h u m an i t a r i a n s  
Beyond disaster relief, a frequent topic in publications and debates about the future 
consequences of climate change is complex humanitarian emergencies. These come 
about because of a confluence of consequences of climate change with a lack of ca-
pacity to deal with the causes of violent conflicts. They are marked by a combination 
of the threat or use of physical violence with shortages of food, housing, and other 
basic requirements. Examples include the lack of capacities of authorities to prevent 
disasters from fanning conflicts or the combination of major negative consequences 
of climate change with state collapse or refugee flows in conflict areas. Frequently, 
in the literature on climate change, complex emergencies are seen as a major future 
risk in conflict areas or those already marginalized economically (WBGU 2008; 
Smith and Vivekananda 2007). 
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Predictions of an increased number of military interventions by Western powers 
are often based on such assessments. For instance, authors of the UK Foresight re-
port argue about the combination of climate change and violent conflict: 
[…] in many countries that face the double-headed problem, the government is going to 
be either unwilling or unable – or both – to take on the task of adaptation and peacebuild-
ing. […] The task of helping communities adapt to climate change cannot be left to such 
governments (Foresight 2011, 23)”. Mabey et al write that “… security in the 21st century 
will require a major increase in the capacity to launch coordinated international human-
itarian and preventive missions (Mabey et al. 2011, 133). 
Few countries currently maintain armed forces that are optimized for such human-
itarian interventions, implying the need to change force structures if the importance 
of this function increases. Even in countries, in which armed forces already focus on 
this role, a greater demand for such interventions will require additional funding 
(Table 1). 
C l i m a t e  w a r r i o r s  
As mentioned above, some authors have argued that climate change is likely to lead 
to national security problems, implying that larger militaries capable of fighting con-
ventional wars will be needed. Some critics of the argument that climate change pre-
sents a national security problem have expressed their fear that climate change may 
be instrumentalized to legitimize larger and stronger militaries. 
While there are many suggestions of future “climate wars” (e. g. Dyer 2008), few 
governments have adopted the view that climate change is likely to result in a tradi-
tional national security problem. Very informative in this respect are the debates on 
climate change, which have occurred in the UN Security Council in 2007, 2011, and 
2018. The majority of governments argued that climate change was a “human secu-
rity” issue; nonetheless, a good number denied that it was a security issue by any 
means. However, some of the biggest military powers, including the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Russia, are among those who express fears about tensions 
rising with sea levels, water shortages, the melting of ice sheets, and other conse-
quences of climate change that may amount to national security challenges. 
Among the greatest worries are conflicts over resources, their shortage, but also 
their abundance. A prominent example of a region, in which climate change may 
change the availability of natural resources, is the Arctic. It is often seen as a region 
of future competition among major states, including Russia, the United States, and 
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potentially even China. This has already led to military planning and action in a num-
ber of countries (Bailes and Heininen 2012, Heininen 2014). 
Other potential national security hot spots of climate change have been mentioned 
in the relevant literature. However, any prediction about future military action result-
ing from climate change is subject to the assumption that climate change will increase 
threats to national security. While climate change does have this potential, it need not 
be this way. As in the prominent case of the Arctic, other factors, including the interest 
to avoid wars, may offset the tensions created by climate change. 
M i l i t a r y  fu t u r e s  i n  o v e r v i e w  
The consequences of climate change remain uncertain, and so do the possible 
changes in the perceived future requirements for armed forces. Predictions based 
on worst-case scenarios have little basis in current evidence, not only because of the 
associated uncertainties but also due to the inherently political nature of decisions 
over size, structure, and deployment of armed forces. The various “military futures” 
distinguished in this section have partly overlapping and partly differing conse-
quences for armed forces (Table 1). Furthermore, they are partly complementary. 
Thus, the US military has been striving to become “greener” but at the same time 
more efficient in fighting wars for more than a decade. 
Still, military planners and their masters in governments and parliaments will 
have to make choices among military and other budget spending as well as about 
what to prioritize among the potential roles and functions of armed forces. These 
choices are inherently a political decision, an issue I will turn to in the next section. 
C h o o s i n g  m i l i t a r y  fu t u r e s  –  t h e  e v i d e n c e  fr o m  
n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  d o c u m e n t s  
I n t r o d u c i n g  t h e  d a t a  s e t  
This section will focus on the available evidence about what decision makers have 
authorized as views about the future of armed forces in the wake of climate change. 
The emphasis of the analysis thus shifts from general suggestions on the military 
implications of climate change to the examination of how changes of the role and 
functions of armed forces as a result of climate change are described in authoritative 
documents on military planning. The classification developed above is used for this 
purpose. Sources for the analysis are official authoritative documents such as white 
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papers and similar official documents on national security and defense planning (see 
also Brzoska 2012). In total, 53 documents from 38 countries made public between 
2001 and 2013 were analyzed (see Brzoska 2015 for more detail). They were collected 
through an extensive internet search for documents authorized by governments or 
Ministries of Defense, describing the role of armed forces in national security poli-
cies. Because for many countries such documents are not available or not published 
on the internet, the set of documents used here is not representative. It has a strong 
bias towards countries from the global North with open political systems and above 
average per capita income. Still, it presents a fairly broad array of perceptions of the 
consequences of climate change for military planning. Very few documents contain 
direct references to future roles and functions of armed forces. However, many con-
tain lines of arguments which imply preferences for one or more of the military fu-
tures. Both instances of evidence of perceived links between climate change and the 
military were linked to the six military futures identified above (Table 1) through a 
number of keywords, used as frames for the analysis of the documents. In order to 
capture those cases, in which climate change was not mentioned in a document at all 
or was explicitly mentioned as not being connected to security or not having an in-
fluence on military planning, a seventh analytical category of “naysayers” was added. 
Two sets of frames were used. The first set relates to the explicit mentioning of 
consequences of climate change for armed forces. Such direct connections were re-
lated to the six “military futures” identified above (Table 2). The second set of frames 
relates more indirectly to potential futures for armed forces. It takes particular argu-
ments about policy priorities to meet the challenge of climate change and identifies 
them as being relevant for the future of armed forces. To explain in more detail: Since 
the documents analyzed here all are about security, it is assumed that a policy priority 
on mitigation implies that armed forces should become “leaner” in order to increase 
the amount of financial resources available for the funding of mitigation. Where adap-
tion was emphasized as a priority in the documents, this is classified as providing ar-
guments for a “greener military”, one that is more adapted to future ecological require-
ments. Similarly, where “resource re-allocation” was mentioned in the documents as a 
necessary response to climate change, this was classified as the proposition of a 
“greener military”. These frames are assumed to prioritize particular military futures 
but may also support other changes in armed forces as well. For instance, arguing for 
the need for adaptation may not only intend to reduce the energy consumption of 
armed forces but also be a reaction to expected future vulnerabilities. In both the US 
and the UK, threats to military installations were a major driving force for adapting 
energy saving projects2. 
                                                                          
2 I am grateful to Delf Rothe for making me aware of this argument. 
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The framing was more straightforward where “disaster management” or humanitar-
ian action was prioritized, as these relate fairly directly to the above identified “military 
futures”, even when the armed forces were not explicitly mentioned as actors perform-
ing these functions. 
In total, 79 such frames were found in the 53 documents. The following sections 
first provide a frequency count of the six military futures, which is then enhanced by 
a time perspective. Two additional sections address the question of potential drivers 
of different military futures. Two such potential drivers are investigated: the percep-
tion of the extent of the threat emanating from climate change and the power status 
of the relevant governments responsible for the documents. Data for the first driver 
are also taken from these documents, while the power status is taken from a stand-
ard source. These two drivers certainly do not exhaust the list of possible factors in-
fluencing perceptions of the effects of climate change on armed forces but rather 
represent a first attempt at finding explanations. 
T h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  “ m i l i t a r y  fu t u r e s ”  
Among the “military futures”, the storyline of the armed forces as “rescuers” is found 
most frequently in the documents analyzed here (Table 3). This is in line with other 
research that also found disaster management to be the predominant response to 
climate change connected with the future of armed forces (Oels 2011; Oels 2012, 
Brzoska 2012). To some extent, this reflects the high degree of uncertainty about the 
consequences of climate change, which may be of relevance for armed forces. After 
the frames linked to “rescuers”, three others add up to a similar number of counts, 


















































Table 2:  Frames for the classification of  “military futures”.  
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frequent). These military futures, while clearly less frequently mentioned than “res-
cuers”, are found in a diversified set of countries. This is different for the two re-
maining categories, which are mentioned least frequently, “warriors” and “victims”. 
These frames were only found in official documents from the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 
 
P r i o r i t i e s  o v e r  t i m e  
The debate about potential security impacts of climate change began in the late 1990s 
and reached a peak in 2007/2008. There is reason to expect that perceptions of the 
future role of armed forces have changed with the ups and downs of this debate. The 
analysis of relevant security documents is therefore divided into three periods: doc-
uments published prior to 2007, those published during the period of intense debate 
on the security implications of climate change in 2007/2008, and documents pub-
lished after 2008 (Table 4). 
There are trends over time but there are also some distinct differences between 
these three periods. The number of documents without any mentioning of climate 
change or explicitly denying that climate change is a security threat has dropped con-
siderably. The intense debate on climate change and security during 2007/2008 ob-
viously made it difficult for governments not to take a stance in official documents 
on security strategies and defense planning. 
The share of governments indicating a role of armed forces as “rescuers” has de-
clined concurrently. While this remains the most frequently mentioned category, its 
relative incidence has decreased markedly after 2008. This may be less due to a de-
creased acceptance of a military role in disaster management in the future but rather 
to the global financial crisis beginning in 2007. The increased pressure on public fi-
nances may have reduced the willingness to propose an increased role of armed 
forces in disaster management. The data on “leaner” militaries in the future at least 
also points in this direction. The share of documents that mention the need to real-
locate finances and to put an emphasis on mitigation has doubled between the first 
and the third period, with a big jump after 2008. 
leaner rescuers warriors greener humanitarians victims naysayers 
15 % 38 % 6 % 14 % 11 % 3 % 13 % 
Table 3:  Incidence of  “military futures” in official  defense documents. Percentage of  
frame occurrences.  
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The mentioning of a “greener” future for armed forces has continuously grown, from 
very small to substantial. While again fiscal issues may have played a role, there 
seems to be a growing perception that armed forces can substantially contribute to 
climate change mitigation. It is quite likely that this increase in the official recogni-
tion of the need to “green” armed forces reflects broader programs for the reduction 
of greenhouse gas production, as in the cases of the United Kingdom and the United 
States mentioned above. 
The number of instances, in which armed forces are seen to have a role in complex 
emergencies (“humanitarians”), has increased as well. Again, the debate in 2007/2008 
has had an impact, elevating this “military future” from one being discussed as an op-
tion in the secondary literature to one being mentioned in official documents. How-
ever, the number of governments that foresee a growing fighting role of armed forces 
remains low. Correspondingly, the share of the “warriors” category, where climate 
change is linked to military actions for national security, has not grown. 
In summary, the period of intense debate on climate change and security during 
2007/2008 seems to have substantially increased the awareness of potential conse-
quences of climate change for armed forces. At the same time, perceptions of what 
these consequences might be have not converged but rather widened. The analysis 
here thus confirms the research on a general failure to “securitize” climate change. The 
majority of governments continue to resist the ideas of linking climate change to “hard” 
security and requiring military action in the future. They still see the need to change 
their militaries, predominantly by making them “greener” and “leaner”. 
P e r c e p t i o n  of  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  a s  a  t h r e a t  a n d  m i l i t a r y  fu t u r e s  
Does the way in which climate change is perceived make a difference for the kind of 
“military future” one foresees? Many of the documents analyzed here contain assess-
ments of the importance of climate change as a future threat for security. However, 
perceptions of the type of the future extent of climate change differ. These were 
period 
 




pre-2007 6 % 11 % 0 % 50 % 0 % 6 % 28 % 
2007/2008 14 % 10 % 7 % 41 % 14 % 7 % 7 % 
post-2008 19 % 22 % 0 % 28 % 16 % 6 % 9 % 
Table 4:  Predominant “military futures” in defense planning documents over time 
Percentage of  frame counts.  
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coded into four “threat levels” of climate change: None/negligible (this also includes 
the lack of mentioning of climate change in the document), minor, emerging, poten-
tially large, and major3. 
The data presented in Table 5 indicate that the perception of the severity of cli-
mate change, and in particular its relevance for security, makes a difference with 
respect to some of the potential “military futures”. Differences are notable, for in-
stance, for the category of “leaner” militaries, which gets more prominent with in-
creasing perception of the importance of climate change. The same holds for “hu-
manitarians”, where the opposite is the case. Obviously, the category of naysayers 
not seeing climate change as a security issue or not seeing any role for armed forces 
in future climate change is particularly large when climate change is seen as no or 
only a negligible threat. For other “military futures”, however, no systematic differ-
ence is notable in the perception of the danger of climate change. 
climate change threat greener leaner victims rescuers humanitarians warriors naysayers 
none or negligible 0 % 6 % 0 % 29 % 12 % 0 % 53 % 
minor 9 % 18 % 0 % 55 % 0 % 9 % 9 % 
emerging 24 % 10 % 0 % 48 % 10 % 10 % 0 % 
potentially large 8 % 23 % 8 % 38 % 8 % 15 % 0 % 
major 22 % 22 % 6 % 22 % 22 % 6 % 0 % 
P o w e rfu l  v e r s u s  s m a l l  c o u n t r i e s ?  
Another possible explanation for differing “military futures” are security policies of 
governments, particularly with respect to the role they intend to play in global power 
politics. In an attempt to analyze this potential explanation, countries were grouped 
into four categories indicating different levels of “power”: Major powers, regional pow-
ers, local powers, and small states. The classification of countries into these groups is 
based on the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), initially created by J. Da-
vid Singer and maintained by the Correlates of War project.4 It attempts to measure 
“hard power” by using the averages of the percentages of a particular country’s indices 
in world rankings of six different components representing demographic, economic, 
and military strength. 
                                                                          
3 For coding rules and procedures, see Brzoska 2015. 
4 For details of composition and data see http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities, 
last accessed 5 August 2020. 
Table 5:   Climate change threats and “military futures” -  Percentage of  total frame counts.  
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The data (Table 6) show that “hard” power is important for explaining the perceptions 
of climate change on the future of armed forces. However, it does not suffice as an 
explanatory factor. Governments differ in their views about “military futures” even 
if they are in the same power category. This is particularly obvious for the two major 
powers China and the United States, at least as reflected in the documents published 
since 2007. While documents from the United States since 2007 portray climate 
change as a major threat that will shape the future of armed forces in many ways, the 
Chinese government refuses to consider climate change a traditional security issue. 
Implications for armed forces are only foreseen in the field of disaster management. 
However, China is somewhat atypical. In general, perceptions of future roles corre-
spond with the expectation that power does make a difference. States that are more 
powerful expect militaries to become leaner or “rescuers” less frequently. Instead, 
they increasingly expect armed forces to have a role in complex emergencies, and 
even to become victims and warriors. Their generally wider range and greater im-
portance of military efforts also reaffirm their expectations of the consequences of 
climate change for armed forces. 
 
C o n c l u s i o n s  
Climate change has become an issue for armed forces worldwide (Carmen et al 2010; 
Holland and Vagg 2013). The number of governments that do not explicitly foresee 
or imply the need for changes in the functions, internal structure and funding of 
armed forces when presenting their views of national security and the future of 
armed forces has become rather small. 
It is shown that the intensive debate on the security implications of climate 
change in 2007/2008 has raised the level of attention towards the implications of cli-
mate change in security institutions worldwide. Potential consequences of climate 
change have added another justification for expanding armed forces but have also 
raised the possibility that funding for armed forces will be cut in order to reallocate 
power status greener leaner victims rescuers humanitarians warriors naysayers 
minor 14 % 21 % 0 % 50 % 4 % 0 % 11 % 
local 12 % 18 % 0 % 41 % 6 % 12 % 12 % 
regional 15 % 5 % 5 % 25 % 20 % 5 % 25 % 
major 13 % 13 % 7 % 27 % 20 % 20 % 0 % 
Table 6:  Power status and “military futures” -  Percentage of  frame counts.  
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money away from armed forces towards investments into climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. There is a wide divergence of perceptions of changes concerning fu-
ture shape, size, and structure of armed forces to expect with climate change. The 
documents analyzed here indicate a broadening of the range of perceptions of the 
consequences of climate change for armed forces. The most frequent response to the 
expected challenges is the indication to increase disaster management capacities. 
However, the relative importance of this “military future” has decreased over the 
past ten years or so, when climate change first became an issue in documents on se-
curity strategies and defense planning. Responses have become more differentiated, 
albeit not necessarily in the same direction. In some countries the emphasis lies on 
making the armed forces “greener”, in others it is on increasing their capabilities to 
successfully address complex emergencies. 
Climate change has become a standard issue in national security thinking and 
defense planning. However, with the exception of a few countries over certain peri-
ods (US, UK), climate change has not been a dominating issue. Thus, indications of 
the effects of climate change on force planning are generally embedded in broader 
perceptions of the roles of armed forces. Armed forces, which are already used for 
power projection, are seen as facing a new threat, while militaries that predomi-
nantly already have “secondary” functions are predicted to remain focused on these. 
A general perception of the importance of climate change, combined with much un-
certainty about its consequences, seems to feed the expectation that climate change 
will amplify already existing priorities of armed forces. There are only a few cases, 
albeit growing in numbers, where investments in climate change mitigation and 
adaption are already on their way. Correspondingly, “national security” is one of the 
least-mentioned sectors for which adaptive responses are reported in a recent survey 
of National Communications prepared by 117 parties to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Lesnikowski et al 2015, 287). Judg-
ing by the official documents analyzed here, climate change has not been generally 
“militarized” in the way some other threats have in the past, most notably during the 
Cold War. Tendencies to so, which were notable in 2007/2008 can only be detected 
in a few countries, such as the US and the UK, and have been weakened since then 
even in these instances. In the majority of cases, climate change has become another 
legitimization for the allocation of resources to armed forces, based on the argument 
that there will be a necessity for increased demand for military capabilities, even 
though there is no clear understanding of its specificity. 
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